DPJ's punishment of rebels too lenient
Was this the best the Democratic Party of Japan could do to put its foot down?
The ruling party on Monday decided on punishments for 15 of its House of Representatives lawmakers who did not attend or abstained from voting on a recent no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Naoto Kan.
Former DPJ President Ichiro Ozawa and seven other lawmakers had their party membership suspended for three months, and five first-term lawmakers were severely reprimanded. Two others who submitted doctor's certificates to show why they were absent from the vote were not punished.
The three-month membership suspension effectively deprives the lawmakers of the right to vote in a DPJ presidential election if it were held during that period.
Ozawa, who has been forcibly indicted for allegedly violating the Political Funds Control Law, had already had his party membership suspended until a verdict is finalized in the case. The bottom line is that no fresh punishment was imposed on the party heavyweight.
Voting against the party line on a no-confidence motion against the Cabinet has grave implications for ruling party members--in particular for Ozawa, who did not attend the vote after initially calling openly for Kan to step down.
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Surrender to in-house pressure
DPJ Secretary General Katsuya Okada originally considered imposing stricter punishments on the rebels. However, he had no alternative but to choose extremely lenient penalties in the face of opposition from within the party.
No one in the party takes responsibility, or is asked to do so, even for blunders that undermine the national interest and result in election setbacks. Is it the DPJ's culture to blur where responsibility lies?
Slapping harsh punishments on Ozawa and his followers would have been a touchstone for the party leadership over its resolve to drastically review the party's manifesto for the 2009 general election, an overhaul the pro-Ozawa lawmakers oppose. But the party leadership buckled.
The DPJ's manifesto review committee held its first meeting last week and finally started checking how much of the party's 2009 platform and campaign pledges for the 2010 House of Councillors election have been achieved.
Almost one year and nine months have passed since the DPJ-led coalition government was inaugurated. It compiled regular annual budgets for fiscal 2010 and fiscal 2011. But given a lack of fiscal resources and political clout, it has become obvious that the DPJ will not be able to implement policies it expounded in its campaign platform.
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Ditch handout policies
It is useless to examine now to what extent the policies in the manifesto have been implemented because the platform itself is flawed. The DPJ is being urged to make a sweeping review of its campaign pledges, which is a prerequisite for forming a grand coalition with the Liberal Democratic Party and other parties.
Given that reconstruction projects in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake will require an astronomical amount of money, handout policies such as child-rearing allowances and making expressways toll-free must be rescinded. A certain level of tax increase also will be essential.
If the DPJ carries out a lukewarm review of its campaign platform at this juncture, any government created with opposition parties after Kan steps down will not be sufficiently strong. A bid to forge a grand coalition would fail and the government might not even be able to secure noncabinet cooperation or a partial coalition.
Under a divided Diet where the upper house is controlled by the opposition camp, domestic politics will become gridlocked again. Such futility must be prevented from happening again by all means.
The manifesto review panel should put together concrete revision proposals as soon as possible and persuade the party to approve them.
N-damage compensation bill must pass quickly
Prime Minister Naoto Kan's Cabinet on Tuesday approved and submitted to the Diet a bill to help Tokyo Electric Power Co. make massive compensation payments for damage caused by the ongoing crisis at its Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.
Compensation to be paid to residents and businesses affected by the nuclear crisis is expected to add up to trillions of yen. That will be more money than TEPCO can raise by itself.
It is an urgent task to develop a public support framework ensuring smooth payment of compensation. The ruling and opposition parties should put priority on the relief of victims and try to pass the bill as soon as possible.
According to the bill, a nuclear damage compensation support organization would be created with contributions from TEPCO and the other electric power companies around the country that have nuclear power plants. The organization would support TEPCO's cash management with a capital injection and other forms of financial assistance.
If it runs short of funds, the government would inject public money to the organization in the form of government-guaranteed loans and no-interest government bonds that it can cash in at any time. TEPCO would repay such public money to the government via the organization over many years, according to the bill.
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TEPCO running out of money
The Nuclear Damage Compensation Law has a clause discharging an electric power company from liability for a nuclear accident caused by a massive natural disaster. However, the clause was not applied to TEPCO this time and the utility has been held primarily responsible for damages.
The government has essentially paid only 120 billion yen in compensation for damage caused by the nuclear crisis. This is its portion as stipulated by the law. However, isn't this insufficient in light of the government's share of responsibility for promoting nuclear power?
Meanwhile, things are getting worse. TEPCO is making provisional compensation payments to evacuated residents, farmers and others from the 120 billion yen provided by the government, but this money is expected to run out by the end of this month.
In July, the government is scheduled to announce official standards for calculating compensation according to various categories of damage. Based on those standards, actual liability claims in amounts much greater than the provisional payments will begin to be made.
If passage of the bill is delayed, TEPCO may fall into a financial crisis, such as a capital deficit. That not only will delay compensation payments to the victims but also will become an impediment to settling the nuclear crisis and stably supplying electricity.
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Power industry threatened
TEPCO's stock price temporarily fell as low as one-10th of its pre-disaster level. Out of concern over a possible ripple effect, Kansai Electric Power Co. postponed issuance of corporate bonds that was originally scheduled for this month. If the situation is left unattended, credit uncertainty is highly likely to spread throughout the electric power industry.
Meanwhile, the current Diet session is coming to an end. If it is necessary to pass the bill, the administration should decide to extend the term of the current session.
It also goes without saying that TEPCO must do everything it can to make compensation payments, including downsizing of its business operation.
The utility has already announced a plan to secure more than 1 trillion yen by cutting costs and selling off assets. But the government will soon demand that TEPCO secure more funds and will start assessing all of its property. TEPCO should fully cooperate with the government.