Brotherhood: the cake is ours
True, a chapter is gone. A black phase seems to have passed, at least for now. Currently, we have a newly-elected president and a new chapter in our contemporary history has begun. But is the future filled with pitfalls, or is it a future marking a new era of progress? Who knows? Only time will tell.
Apparently, there are some positive signs taking place, like the return of foreign investment, political semi-stability and measured expectations for the time ahead. The president says that 100 days are enough to deal with major strategic issues affecting the daily life of people.
His followers hope for a prosperous future while opponents are watching and waiting, readying themselves to pounce. The outside world is also watching with its own agenda, at times in direct conflict the president’s aspirations to reform the country.
Last, and not least, the Muslim Brotherhood has its own agenda based on absolute rule and total dominance. For them, there is no exception to the rule and no compromise on its objective.
Going back to history and reading the chapters of the development of one of the most organised religious-based groups, the Brotherhood, observers can note how well-integrated the organisation can be at infusing itself into public life.
We have seen this before. The Brotherhood has proved it has a distinct blueprint to integrating itself into society. It operates charity and clinical organisations that seek to respond to basic human needs. It mobilises uneducated populations by using Islam.
President Mohamed Mursi is no exception. For him, there is a heavy bill to be paid. The man on the street voted for a president who represents his look as well as his mind and heart. He is in the common man and common woman’s’ point of view ready and able to deliver miracles.
For people like devoted to the ideals and staunch beliefs entrenched in the Brotherhood, Egypt is only one district within the large Islamic peninsula, the Ummah. President Mursi is caught between the ideals of staunch Islamists and Islamic reformers. From one side, the bill should be paid in favour of various supporters, and on the other side, the large opposition, abiding by legitimacy, denying his illusive ascent to power and taking it only for an ipso facto subject to change.
The harsh reality coupled with the impossibility of submitting the Egypptian social fabric to radical and dramatic changes “a la Salafits” makes this hero’s dream hard to achieve.
While the Brotherhood has the ability to twist around and maneuver, flexibly reaching their objectives, Salafis are rigid, and stubborn enough to never alter visions and adopt objectives other than their own. The Salafists dream of power, use aggression, and prefer violence than submit to the “other.” Their agenda is based on Islamic principles, devoid of the wants and needs of the ‘street.’
Unlike the apparent peace and harmony, conflicts are waiting somewhere in the midst of this conundrum.The cake should be divided. Yet, the Brotherhood will never share their piece, but will they do it now, after their ultimate ascension to power? Absolutely not, it is a fact, preserved in history. They have always proved the same, time and time again. A clash is inevitable.
Time will reveal the other face of their religion and politics marriage. Should we expect failure? Not necessarily. If the model succeeds, it should be for our benefit. If it were to fail, an inevitable confrontation would ensue.
Rumours are flying all around in the air and, again, only time will tell. Our agendas are not the same and will never be. The layman is searching out a good living. The opposition is looking for its power back. These two conflicting ideas will never match one another.
President Morsi should prove his strategic thinking, strong management, absolute freedom, and extraordinary skill to manage such a controversy-riddled situation in order to become truly one-of-a-kind.
If the man succeeds pulling us from this crisis, I will be the first one to make up my mind and, proudly, vote for him again.
Morsi’s ties with Muslim Brotherhood
As president Mohamed Morsi continues to assume his tasks as Egypt’s first civilian president, a few columnists in Egyptian newspapers have rejected the idea that Morsi shall cut ties with his Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and become a truly non-partisan president.
Other columnists have paid tribute to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) for fulfilling their promise with regards to transferring powers to a civilian president.
Amr Al-Shobaki
Al-Masry Al-Youm
Al-Masry Al-Youm
In his column, ‘The partisan president,’ Amr Al-Shobaki denounced those urging the newly elected president Mohamed Morsi to quit his Freedom and Justice Party and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Al-Shobaki said in modern democracies, any president rising to power on the shoulders of a political party, has a clear partisan agenda.
It is by virtue of the party’s ideology and vision voters are convinced to elect the president.
It is equally hard to imagine Morsi, after long years with the Brotherhood, rejecting the principles of the party and the Revival Project based on his predecessor’s abuse of power.
In Al-Shobaki’s estimation, the case of Hosni Mubarak is hardly comparable with Morsi, in the sense that Mubarak did not necessarily need to operate through the NDP.
In the last presidential elections, Al-Shobaki said the only candidate affiliated with a political party was Morsi, while his counterpart’s campaign revolved around an independent vision for the future of Egypt.
The writer said having the support of a party was a clear advantage for President Morsi.
In the meantime, Al-Shobaki stressed the need to limit the powers of the president and his political party and reject any attempts to infuse the judiciary system, the army, and the police with party politics.
If the Freedom and Justice Party did in fact attempt to inoculate itself inside other branches of the government, it would mean a return of the former political machine of the NDP.
He said nearly 70 journalists belonging to a major national newspaper have recently applied for membership into the Freedom and Justice Party, in the hopes that their party affiliation would carry them swiftly to the top ranks of the journalist syndicate.
Al-Shobaki suggested the issuance of legislation preventing the president, his political party, and also the opposition, from influencing the judiciary and the legislative authorities.
At the end of the day, the president cannot be hindered from his right to identify with a political party representing his political orientations and agenda, and it is up to voters to accept or reject.
Hassan Nafaa
Al-Masry Al-Youm
Al-Masry Al-Youm
Hassan Nafaa examines the restrictions faced by Egypt’s President Mohamed Morsi, in light of the Supplementary Constitutional Declaration issued by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).
Not only does this declaration deprive the president from appointing a minister of defense other than the current head of the SCAF, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, but it also compels him to maintain the same current formation of the SCAF.
In short, Morsi is banned from making any decisions about the army, until the Constitutional Drafting Committee completes the new constitution.
Nafaa foresees that the role played by the SCAF in the coming period will not be confined to the administration of the armed forces affairs, but will extend to the political sphere.
The SCAF has the right to object to any clause in the new constitution, a situation which will turn Egypt into an entity being run by two heads in two opposite directions.
From another perspective, Morsi is the first elected president after a popular revolution, and proclaims himself the legitimate and natural representative of the revolution’s goals.
In contrast, Tantawi considers himself in a situation where he has to show no compromise in protecting the state’s institutions from revolutionary acts.
Nafaa describes this scene as competing conflict of interests between the revolution and the state, putting the country in an uncomfortable situation.
Nafaa describes this scene as competing conflict of interests between the revolution and the state, putting the country in an uncomfortable situation.
While many see this situation as offering protection for both the state and the revolution, others describe it as catastrophic to both.
Nafaa assesses this dilemma as a critical stage of transition, necessitating extreme wisdom and cooperation from both parties, until the achievement of the revolution’s objectives.
Ammar Ali Hassan
Al-Watan News
Al-Watan News
Ammar Ali Hassan recalls when, two years ago, he left his house toward Al-Faraen channel to appear in ‘Egypt Today’ programme with Tawfik Okasha, after he phoned him numerous times to discuss the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood and the state.
Hassan found Al-Faraen channel’s car waiting for him in front of his house, and immediately sat next to the driver.
After approximately one kilometer, he felt the presence of Mohamed Morsi in the back seat. After both Morsi and Hassan made their appearance on the show, Hassan requested from the driver to drop off the elder Morsi first, but Morsi requested the opposite since Hassan lived farther away.
Hassan recalls these memories, and compares them to the current situation, where Morsi is the president of the republic and Okasha is staunchly attacking him.
In the past, Al-Faraen channel was in its early days, trying to secure itself a spot in the middle of the rigorous competition between Arab satellite channels, Hassan notes.
Despite being linked with the National Democratic Party (NDP), Okasha used to invite iconic opposition figures to his talk show, and discuss with them issues such as corruption, the future of the presidency, and the performance of the executive and legislative authorities. On the other hand, opposition activists were desperately searching for a podium to express their resistance to the former regime.
It was in this context that Morsi appeared on Al-Faraen channel to slam Mubarak’s regime and to rebut allegations of the Muslim Brotherhood collusion with the NDP in the parliamentary elections of 2005.
Now things have changed, and Morsi has become the president fiercely criticised by Al-Faraen channel.
Hassan predicts the relationship between Al-Faraen and the brotherhood cannot be predicted, and that the foes of today, can all be the friends of tomorrow.
Emad Al-Din Hussein
Al-Shorouk News
Al-Shorouk News
Emad Al-Din Hussein examined President Mohamed Morsi’s statements before the commanders of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) last Saturday, in the Hike Step military compound.
Morsi praised the SCAF and vowed to safeguard the army and its personnel.
While Hussein’s assessment is that Morsi made such statements out of his attempt to cease hostilities with the junta, he reiterates that comprehensively, Morsi was politically smart.
While nobody believed SCAF would organise true presidential elections, the opposite happened.
The SCAF did not impose Omar Suleiman on the populace, and even Ahmed Shafiq, who many believed was a SCAF favorite, lost to the
Muslim Brotherhood.
Muslim Brotherhood.
After the rise of Morsi to power, many were expecting the SCAF to cancel the election’s results and take control of the country.
However, the proceedings of last Saturday put an end to these speculations, when the SCAF officially handed over power to the elected president.
Hussein considered this as a qualitative success for the revolution, which succeeded in imposing its candidate.
Though, still, many revolutionaires believe Morsi is neither a revolutionary or a leader seeking to dramatically alter the political landscape.
In addition, the author lauded Morsi’s speech before the nation’s representatives in the main hall of Cairo University as a rebirth of the Egyptian civilisation.
Despite the necessity to pay tribute to the SCAF, Hussein pinpoints some of the major errors committed by the military junta with regards to their poor management of the transitional period, which ended with Egyptians unwilling to vote for either Morsi or Shafiq in the presidential elections run-off.
In conclusion, Hussein regarded last Saturday as the first step on a long road toward a real democratic, civil, and modern state.
Morsi’s scales of justice
As millions of Egyptians sat glued to TV screens listening to their new civilian president’s inaugural speech on Saturday, a wide array of public representatives were among the audience in Cairo University’s hall.
One day before he was sworn in at the Supreme Constitutional Court, Mohamed Morsi had already addressed a huge crowd at Tahrir Square saying: “I’m standing before you, Egyptian people, those who voted for me, those who opposed me… I am yours.”
In his public speeches, Morsi endeavours to make real his intentions to please everyone- and by that I mean revolutionaries, minorities and the Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF).
Morsi seems to be willing to address almost all demands requested by revolutionary Egyptians.
For them Morsi represents the revolution and its objectives. Is he up to this? The new president might face obstacles when he figures out that some revolutionary demands will upset the SCAF.
On Sunday, demonstrators led a march to the presidential palace with a petition demanding the release of all detainees facing military trials.
The move came after Morsi had promised to meet the families of activists currently facing military detention and examine their cases.
The question is: how will SCAF officials react if Morsi deliberately contradicts military rule, especially amid claims that he struck a power-sharing deal to win the presidency?
Another puzzling dilemma is how Morsi will fulfill his promises to safeguard the rights of the Coptic minority, and maintain the support of the Salafist bloc that aspires to establish pure Islamist rule.
The president has repeatedly pledged to offer Christians their full rights and personal freedoms, especially after that segment of Egyptian society has been beset with an atmosphere of perplexity and fear following the victory of the Islamist candidate.
On the other side, the President has been supported by the Salafist bloc, and has met with figureheads from the Salafist front, who are all clinging to the hope that Morsi will apply Islamic law literally rather than working more loosely from the general principles of the religion.
All plights are in addition to concerns already related to Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Will he lead the country independently, shying away from any advice or consultation stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood’s general guidance bureau?
This –probably- will lead to Morsi pleasing one side at the expense of the other.
Morsi’s first 100 days have started on Saturday. And in only two days, all eyes are already wide open to examine the new president’s performance.
Egyptians have heightened their monitoring and assessment of Morsi’s moves and actions.
Cynically, the president’s competence is being measured on the online ‘Morsi Meter,’ a portal that evaluates what deliverables have been achieved and which are outstanding. Many Egyptians regard the president as a new employee in his ‘probation’ period.
With predicaments at every turn, the president is in a tight spot. He does have to weigh his options and learn to truly manifest his justice-scale presidential symbol.
Will Morsi manage to walk road less traveled without stepping on any one’s foot? Good luck Mr. President!