German elections: Green shoots
Unless Merkel can engineer a recovery, the German government faces a period of weakness when Europe needs German strength
Europe has seen many examples of electorates delivering the order of the boot to governments that have led them into recession and financial misery. Weekend state-level election results in Germany, however, suggest that voters who stayed in work and funds throughout the recession are just as unimpressed with the parties of power as those who have fared far worse.
In the prosperous state of Baden-Württemberg, where the local economy is growing by an enviable 5.5% and unemployment is a mere 4.3%, voters this weekend threw out Chancellor Angela Merkel's centre-right CDU for the first time in half a century. In its place, they handed power to what is likely to become Germany's first Green party-led state coalition. Meanwhile in Rheinland-Pfalz, the CDU could not muster enough support to oust a tired state government led by the unpopular centre-left SPD; here again, a strong Green performance tipped the balance against Mrs Merkel's party.
These are sensational results, particularly by German standards. The humiliation for the CDU is a huge one, with the loss of Baden-Württemberg following hard upon a bad defeat in Hamburg last month. The Green success is the third great step in the party's electoral history, following election to the Bundestag in 1983 and to coalition government in 1998. The results are a mixed bag for the SPD, which will be a party of government in both states even though its vote fell in both. But the real loser is Mrs Merkel's junior coalition ally, the liberal FDP. Its poor showing will increase the pressure on its leader Guido Westerwelle, the current foreign minister. None of this is immediately threatening to Mrs Merkel's government (the next federal election is not due until 2013). Yet it will revive talk about the CDU exploring other coalition options, including even with the Greens.
It is not hard to see these elections as a verdict on the manoeuvrings on the nuclear power issue in the wake of the Fukushima reactor crisis – the CDU was punished and the Greens rewarded for Mrs Merkel's shameless U-turn this month – and also to suspect that such a combination of events will not operate with such potency in 2013. Yet the FDP's collapse poses a long-term threat to Mrs Merkel's preferred strategy, while the Green surge and the SDP doldrums point to possible realignment on the left. Mrs Merkel remains a skilful wielder of power. She has no obvious rival since the fall of her defence minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg. Yet unless she can engineer a recovery of direction and fortune for one of the federal government coalition parties in the next two years, the German government faces a period of greater weakness at a time when Europe could use a period of greater German strength.
In the prosperous state of Baden-Württemberg, where the local economy is growing by an enviable 5.5% and unemployment is a mere 4.3%, voters this weekend threw out Chancellor Angela Merkel's centre-right CDU for the first time in half a century. In its place, they handed power to what is likely to become Germany's first Green party-led state coalition. Meanwhile in Rheinland-Pfalz, the CDU could not muster enough support to oust a tired state government led by the unpopular centre-left SPD; here again, a strong Green performance tipped the balance against Mrs Merkel's party.
These are sensational results, particularly by German standards. The humiliation for the CDU is a huge one, with the loss of Baden-Württemberg following hard upon a bad defeat in Hamburg last month. The Green success is the third great step in the party's electoral history, following election to the Bundestag in 1983 and to coalition government in 1998. The results are a mixed bag for the SPD, which will be a party of government in both states even though its vote fell in both. But the real loser is Mrs Merkel's junior coalition ally, the liberal FDP. Its poor showing will increase the pressure on its leader Guido Westerwelle, the current foreign minister. None of this is immediately threatening to Mrs Merkel's government (the next federal election is not due until 2013). Yet it will revive talk about the CDU exploring other coalition options, including even with the Greens.
It is not hard to see these elections as a verdict on the manoeuvrings on the nuclear power issue in the wake of the Fukushima reactor crisis – the CDU was punished and the Greens rewarded for Mrs Merkel's shameless U-turn this month – and also to suspect that such a combination of events will not operate with such potency in 2013. Yet the FDP's collapse poses a long-term threat to Mrs Merkel's preferred strategy, while the Green surge and the SDP doldrums point to possible realignment on the left. Mrs Merkel remains a skilful wielder of power. She has no obvious rival since the fall of her defence minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg. Yet unless she can engineer a recovery of direction and fortune for one of the federal government coalition parties in the next two years, the German government faces a period of greater weakness at a time when Europe could use a period of greater German strength.
Libya: Narrowing the options
Today in London a large gathering of foreign ministers will be attempting to resolve some of the contradictions
The decision to intervene in Libya has been weighed down from the beginning by a heavy load of the euphemisms, ambiguities, and hypocrisies which so often accompany the resort to violence in international affairs. The keenest advocates of action, France and Britain, had to formulate their proposals to the United Nations in narrowly humanitarian terms in order to convince some doubtful nations that they would not pursue regime change directly, and to manoeuvre others, like Russia and China, into a position where they would have looked like reactionary allies of Gaddafi if they had vetoed the resolution which was eventually adopted.
The country that alone was capable of providing the military muscle to enforce the resolution, the United States, insisted for domestic political reasons that its unavoidable leadership role be disguised behind a screen of Nato machinery. That led to much posing and obstruction by Nato members pursuing other agendas, especially France with its idea of European military autonomy and Turkey with its pretensions to be seen again as a protector and spokesman for the Middle East as a whole. In the ensuing confusion, valuable time was lost, time which could, for instance, have been used to intervene earlier against Gaddafi's forces threatening Misrata, Libya's third largest city and the main stronghold of the uprising against the regime in the west of the country. Now those forces are in the city, from which it will be hard to dislodge them without causing unacceptable civilian casualties.
Today in London a large gathering of foreign ministers and other representatives will be attempting to resolve some of the contradictions which they themselves have created, while a smaller group of the countries forming the steering committee for what is now a Nato operation will also be meeting. The main issue before them is to decide at what point Nato action ceases to be about protecting civilians from Gaddafi and begins to be about prosecuting a war on behalf of Libyan insurgents who appear unable to take and hold ground on their own.
The rebels have been their own worst enemies in this regard. Three military commanders seem to be functioning independently, if not as rivals, while the regular troops who defected in the west of the country have not been committed to operations in an organised way. Undisciplined charges by pick-up trucks are not a strategy. The political coherence of the National Transitional Council has, meanwhile, reportedly been at times very strained.
Russia, Turkey, and perhaps also Italy and Germany, have made up their minds that the line between civilian protection and regime change has already been crossed. Anglo-French tactics can be criticised, but surely there should be no disagreement that the worst possible outcome in Libya would be partition, with a Gaddafi-held zone holding on for months or years. The objection to the Russian and Turkish positions is that they make such an outcome more likely. The critical question is whether the people of western Libya want Gaddafi or not. If they do not, and that is the way the limited evidence certainly points, then policies like immediately winding down the military effort or facilitating a ceasefire will merely give Gaddafi a second wind, unless there are other, relatively peaceful levers that could then remove him, which seems far from guaranteed.
Today in London a large gathering of foreign ministers and other representatives will be attempting to resolve some of the contradictions which they themselves have created, while a smaller group of the countries forming the steering committee for what is now a Nato operation will also be meeting. The main issue before them is to decide at what point Nato action ceases to be about protecting civilians from Gaddafi and begins to be about prosecuting a war on behalf of Libyan insurgents who appear unable to take and hold ground on their own.
The rebels have been their own worst enemies in this regard. Three military commanders seem to be functioning independently, if not as rivals, while the regular troops who defected in the west of the country have not been committed to operations in an organised way. Undisciplined charges by pick-up trucks are not a strategy. The political coherence of the National Transitional Council has, meanwhile, reportedly been at times very strained.
Russia, Turkey, and perhaps also Italy and Germany, have made up their minds that the line between civilian protection and regime change has already been crossed. Anglo-French tactics can be criticised, but surely there should be no disagreement that the worst possible outcome in Libya would be partition, with a Gaddafi-held zone holding on for months or years. The objection to the Russian and Turkish positions is that they make such an outcome more likely. The critical question is whether the people of western Libya want Gaddafi or not. If they do not, and that is the way the limited evidence certainly points, then policies like immediately winding down the military effort or facilitating a ceasefire will merely give Gaddafi a second wind, unless there are other, relatively peaceful levers that could then remove him, which seems far from guaranteed.
The emerging compromise may be that for a few more days the current rules of engagement, allowing ground attacks on military assets not directly or actively threatening civilians, will continue in force but then a narrower interpretation will prevail. That gives Nato planes a slender window to tip the military balance further against Gaddafi. Thereafter it may well get much more difficult, and, if it does, some countries may have much to answer for.
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