Cabinet changes do littleto help disaster recovery
Prime Minister Naoto Kan has finally clarified his hitherto vague "conditions" for resigning his post.
At a press conference on Monday, he said he is ready to step down after securing Diet passage of the second supplementary budget for fiscal 2011, as well as passage of two bills. One bill concerns special measures to promote renewable energy--by obliging utilities to buy electricity generated by renewable means--and the other bill would enable the government to issue deficit-covering bonds.
But it is questionable that Kan will be able to get these bills passed without a hitch. He would have to unite the government and the ruling parties under the new Cabinet lineup he has just decided on, while also winning the cooperation of opposition parties.
Kan must not let the political vacuum or policy paralysis drag on any longer. We once again call for Kan to quit soon.
In the process of making the slight change to his Cabinet lineup, Kan made a tentative overture to Shizuka Kamei, leader of the People's New Party, a junior partner to the DPJ in the ruling camp, to become deputy prime minister. By bringing Kamei, who had opposed the idea of Kan's resigning, into the Cabinet, Kan probably hoped to reinforce the foundation of his administration.
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Barely holding it together
But Kamei has been at odds with the leadership of the Democratic Party of Japan, which Kan heads, over key policies, as he opposes a hike in the consumption tax rate. It is hardly likely that a united front of the government and the ruling parties will be built.
In the end, Kamei declined the offer but instead agreed to become a special adviser to Kan. It can be said, however, that the latest appointment only ended up exposing the decline in Kan's leadership and the political confusion in the last days of his administration.
Meanwhile, Kan appointed Kazuyuki Hamada, a Liberal Democratic Party member in the House of Councillors, as parliamentary secretary for internal affairs and communications. As it looked as if he were trying to win over members of the main opposition party one at time, this also created a stir.
The LDP has been much offended, with some members calling Kan's appointment of Hamada a direct challenge to the efforts to form a consensus between the ruling and opposition parties.
Such a move would only bring about a contrary effect at a time when the ruling camp badly needs to cooperate with the opposition parties.
As part of a new system to tackle post-disaster reconstruction, Kan also named Ryu Matsumoto to the new post of minister in charge of reconstruction, the linchpin of the reconstruction implementation headquarters. Matsumoto is to serve concurrently as state minister for disaster management.
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Get to work on reconstruction
Meanwhile, Kan also appointed Goshi Hosono, his special adviser, as state minister in charge of dealing with the crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.
It is undeniable that the appointment came too late, as 3-1/2 months have already passed since the March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake.
The reconstruction implementation headquarters must make up for the delays in reconstruction efforts as soon as possible, in what little time is left before Kan steps down.
One of the important tasks Matsumoto faces is to improve communications between the central government and disaster-affected local governments, which have had a strained relationship recently, to come up with effective reconstruction measures.
It is also necessary for the central government to present a road map for reconstruction soon, to help local governments determine what should be done first.
Hosono has to bring the nuclear crisis under control as soon as possible by cooperating closely with Tokyo Electric Power Co., the operator of the troubled plant.
We hope Hosono will soon compile what Kan calls an outline for preventing a nuclear accident from recurring.
Draw up effective steps to deal with gigantic tsunami
How should lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake be used for future disaster response measures? An expert panel of the Central Disaster Management Council, an advisory body of the Cabinet Office, has put together a package of recommendations that call for the central and local governments to overhaul their assumptions about future tsunami.
The size of the tsunami triggered by the March 11 earthquake--and the destruction it caused--was far beyond what governments over the years had expected. The number of victims and the extent of damage were greater than had been assumed because many people could not evacuate in time.
The panel quite rightly acknowledged that the danger of tsunami had been underestimated. The central and local governments need to map out practical tsunami countermeasures as quickly as possible.
In its interim report on tsunami countermeasures, the panel calls for past tsunami to be examined in detail to help calculate the heights of future tsunami and anticipate which areas they will hit.
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Ancient data disregarded
In concrete terms, the panel recommends analyzing ancient documents that mention tsunami and digging along coastlines to search for traces of earlier tsunami. If the results of this work suggest that another huge tsunami could strike this nation's shores, the report proposes strengthening countermeasures in areas likely to be affected.
Until now, countermeasures had been based on experts' assumptions about the possible size of tsunami. Little attention was paid to ancient documents and other data because they provided few specifics.
Conventional defenses prepared for the Tokai, Tonankai and Nankai earthquakes--which are thought to be very likely to occur--were based on the assumption that the quakes would happen separately. But studying past documents and other data has raised concern that the three earthquakes could happen together. If they struck at once, tsunami taller than what has hitherto been predicted would hit various parts of the country, according to a research report.
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Review past assumptions
The government must quickly reexamine assumptions about tsunami in these areas. Many local governments feel anxiety about the current assumptions and countermeasures made based on them.
The report proposes two types of countermeasures depending on the size of tsunami, which are classified as either "gigantic tsunami" that are assumed to occur once in 1,000 years or "great tsunami" that happen every 50 to 150 years.
Gigantic tsunami cannot be dealt with by civil engineering measures alone, such as seawalls. Placing greater emphasis on having residents quickly evacuate, the report calls for constructing evacuation buildings that can withstand tsunami in coastal areas. The panel said these efforts need to involve both "hardware" and "software."
Almost all the students at primary and middle schools in Kamaishi, Iwate Prefecture, safely escaped the March 11 tsunami. Their disaster response education, including evacuation drills, proved its worth. Their escape has even been touted as "the miracle of Kamaishi."
The report says conventional "hardware" measures against "great tsunami" that mainly involved constructing seawalls have had some effect and will be continuously expanded.
Nonetheless, these measures require a huge amount of money. The central and local governments must use their ingenuity to prioritize countermeasures and make them as effective as possible.
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