Morsy, Suez murder and state security
Some writers denounced Morsy’s passivity in relation to the latest Suez incident, where a young engineer was killed. Others questioned the President’s relation to the State security, being one of the former senior figureheads of the once-banned Muslim Brotherhood.
Expert on political Islam Diaa Rashwan examines President Mohamed Morsy’s pre-election promises, in the form of the establishment of the “National Front”; an accord between Dr. Morsy and prominent political, revolutionary and national figures.
The promises he made as part of this front were to appoint an independent patriotic prime minister, not to allow his Freedom and Justice Party to occupy the majority of cabinet seats, and to form a presidential team, consisting of vice-presidents, consultants, and deputies, who represent the wide spectrum of Egypt’s political, religious, and generational differences.
Rashwan states that the Egyptian revolution has taken a different path from the principles originally set out by the ‘National Front’, given the fact that parliamentary and presidential elections pre-assign weights to different political groups based upon votes.
He concludes that the current situation is more the formation of a “National Coalition” than a “National Front”.
Rashwan explains the difference between both concepts. While forming a coalition relates to times when there is no decisive parliamentary majority, forming a “National Front” has been historically linked to the confrontation of a foreign occupation, or counteracting internal instability, such as riots and revolts.
Rashwan concludes that the best solution for the country and the Islamist majority is to allow the latter to implement their agendas uninterrupted. Only then, will Egyptians have the right to either approve or reject such policies, through the ballot boxes.
Amr Al-Shobaki ponders why the demonstrators in both Tahrir Square and Nasr City decided to suspend their strikes simultaneously.
While the Nasr City camp at first speculated about a confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), they soon realised that the transitional period would actually constitute a willful handover of power by the SCAF to the Brotherhood.
It is hardly shocking to recognise the conflict of interests between the Brotherhood and the revolutionaries in Tahrir Square.
This was demonstrated by the acceptance by President Morsy of the Supplementary Constitutional Declaration, and his swearing-in before the Supreme Constitutional Court, despite the denouncement of the declaration by revolutionary groups.
He says that the challenges facing Egypt in the coming period will require the pure soul of Tahrir square.
This does not mean a square mutilated and dominated by one particular political faction which works hard to exploit the revolution in order to serve its narrow interests.
The end of demonstrations in both Tahrir Square and Nasr City, show how both camps need to work through the democratic system and help to re-build the country, rather than try to intimidate their opponents by demonstrating with loud slogans.
Following the tragic killing of the young student Ahmed Hussein Eid in the city of Suez by the self-named ‘Society for Commanding Just and Forbidding Evil’, Wael Kandil calls upon President Morsy to react before it is too late.
While Morsy did not attend the victim’s funeral procession, the least he could do, in Kandil’s estimate, is visit Eid’s family to offer his condolences.
The incident happened soon after the election of the Islamist President Morsy, and has propagated a widespread fear of Islamist rule among ordinary people.
Kandil considers that Morsy’s main emphasis should be to put down these fears, and take immediate action.
Kandil recalls the brutal killing of Khalid Said by police agents, after which ousted President Mubarak did not move a muscle to react.
He sees that regardless of who committed this act, had it been extremist Islamists or agents of the ousted regime’s state security apparatus, President Morsy needs to firmly stand up before the residents of Suez and reaffirm that Egypt will remain a civil, democratic, and just state, governed by law, which respects the sanctity of Egyptian blood.
In an attempt to speculate about the nature of the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood’s President Mohamed Morsy and high-rank police generals, Emad Al-Din Hussein suggests that Morsy, being a major Brotherhood figurehead since 1977, should have a file in the drawers of the disbanded state security apparatus, now called National Security.
Hussein cites a conversation he had with an ex-state security officer, who was transferred to a rural public relations post after the dissolution of the apparatus.
The officer was convinced that the Brotherhood were the reason behind all of the world’s miseries, from terrorism to global warming!
He and many of his police comrades regard the revolution as a coup d’état led by the Muslim Brotherhood, with the assistance of Hamas, the funding of Qatar, and the support of the United States.
From this standpoint, Hussein sees the greatest challenge to be the need to reform the police apparatus rather than just dismiss its personnel.
President Morsy carries the responsibility of re-structuring Egypt’s security by winning confidence among younger ranks.
Hussein warns Morsy against acting like an “Ikhwani” cadre who is out to settle accounts with old rivals, rather he urges him to act as president of all Egyptians.
Editor-in-Chief of Al-Watan Magdi Al-Gallad recounts his relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood.
He knows well that they have been the only political faction with enough organisation and discipline to survive the decay which occurred in all institutions during Mubarak’s era.
While Al-Gallad praises their devotion to their programme, he does not deny his skepticism of the concept of blind obedience which has effectively been the ingredient guaranteeing the Brotherhood’s survival.
Al-Gallad sees no difference in the way in which the Muslim Brotherhood and the ousted National Democratic Party regard media and journalists; they both see them as good, as long as they are ‘in their pockets’.
Al-Gallad declares that his issue with the Brotherhood arises from his ‘journalism disease’, meaning he is unable to remain silent before anything that goes wrong, regardless of the outcomes he might face, and the price he may pay.
Denouncing the way most of media circles are ‘jogging’ towards the Muslim Brotherhood, their Freedom and Justice Party, and their President Mohamed Morsy; Al-Gallad asserted to Morsy that the presidential institution should be the one fearing the media, and not the other way around.
Gallad expresses his surprise that, when this was put to him, Morsy acknowledged this point.
Khalid Montassir denounces the hideous murder of the engineering student Ahmed Hussein in the city of Suez, who was killed in cold blood, by what he terms “Salafist thugs”, in front of his fiancée.
He unequivocally condemns this new form of ‘halal violence’, committed by bearded thugs wearing short jilbabs, and describes those who kill innocent people, in the name of wanting to ‘Command the Just and Forbid the Evil’, as lacking any sense of Islam and humanity.
Montassir questions whether President Mohamed Morsy will visit Hussein’s mother as he did with Khalid Said’s mother, and deal with the lurking threat of religious violence with an iron fist.
He queries whether Morsy will shy away from upsetting the Salafists who helped him to ascend to his presidency, in exchange for a vow to implement Shari’a, in their own hard-line interpretation.
This, he speculates, enables them to interfere in everyone’s personal freedoms under the old canard of protecting the society from vice.
Montassir states that while Salafists killed a young man walking in the street with his legal fiancée, they staunchly defended their MP Ali Wanis after he was caught in a Matrix car with women on three different occasions.
These women included; a girl whom he called “his niece”, another who he named his “fiancée”, and someone he does not know.
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